Posts Tagged With: sociology

A Sociology of Knowledge on Displacement and Humanitarianism

In this post, Dr Estella Carpi identifies the main points she and Prof. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh raise in their contribution to the recently published Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of the Middle East, where they focus on the commonalities and dissimilarities across the academic literature relating to war-induced displacement and humanitarianism in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt.

If you find this post of interest, please visit our Thinking through the Global South series and the recommended reading and listening at the end of this post. 

A Sociology of Knowledge on Displacement and Humanitarianism

by Dr Estella Carpi, Research Associate, Southern Responses to Displacement Project, UCL

The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of the Middle East, edited by Armando Salvatore, Kieko Obuse, and Sari Hanafi, contains my and Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s contribution, a chapter on the sociology of knowledge of studies on war-induced displacement and humanitarianism in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt. Our comparative analysis of academic literature on this topic suggests that similarities and differences across the academic literature are not always motivated by specific forms of state governmentality. Importantly, in the framework of how academic knowledge production relates to political order, we show how postcolonial his­tory seems to only provide partial explanations.

Our chapter, ‘A Sociology of Knowledge on Displacement and Humanitarianism’  primarily emerges from the need to decentralize mainstream knowledge by shedding light on responses to dis­placement led by organizations, governments, informal groups, and individuals from across the Global South, including refugees themselves. It also emerges from our experience with teaching displacement and humani­tarianism in several international institutions and the responses received from different cohorts of students.

In our chapter, we depart from the Syrian “refugee crisis”, started by a popular uprising in March 2011, as it has now become a crucial watershed in international scholarly literature concerned with the Middle East. Indeed, the Syrian crisis has paved the way for a large number of studies focused on humanitarian governance, forced migrations, security and borders, migrant labour, and social integration in receiving coun­tries. In countries where the central state tends to emerge as authoritarian in the organization of society (e.g., Turkey and Egypt), such themes have been addressed differently from po­litical environments where the state has been considered absent and fragile and where political power is fragmented (e.g., Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories). For instance, some forced migrants living in states where the “catastrophization” discourse is unlikely, have not always appeared in academic texts under the label of “refugees” but have instead been categorized as “migrants” since economic and climate-related migrations are both unlikely to be classified as “forced” in the global political arena. Indeed, in Egypt and Turkey, humanitarianism is not a usual analytical framework for the explana­tion of refugee governance and refugee experience.

Our chapter shows that postcoloniality does not explain such peculiar sociologies of knowledge. States like Lebanon have proved that, al­though domestic sovereignty is seemingly fragmented and delegated to more than one ac­tor, they can still curb or hold sway on assistance provision and its layered politics, for ex­ample, forbidding marches in support of refugee employment and living conditions. However, postcoloniality is a key variable in carving out a transnational sociology of knowl­edge of these localities. Identifying this sociology means meditating on the ways in which crisis is defined and understood in different political histories. In this respect, Lebanon is over-characterized by the catastrophe discourse, having a wavering political past and present during which governmental mandates have never lasted long, unlike many other states in the region. Nonetheless, we conclude that it would be incorrect to argue that Lebanon has historical­ly been more exposed to crisis than countries like Jordan, Egypt, or Turkey (also charac­terized by outbreaks of nonstate political violence and coups d’état), because “crisis” per se should have contextual and relativistic meanings and, at times, resides in the ordinary details of everyday life.

Against this backdrop, we define the “sociology of knowledge” as the relationship between the production of knowl­edge and the social context in which it develops and examine how knowledge is con­structed socially and what factors mainly influence such a construction. Since knowledge is contextual, it is shaped as much by the social and political positioning of knowledge producers as by their local, regional, and international environments. Academic cultures —not always overlapping with official “national cultures,” which are defined by the boundaries of the nation-state—frame such topics in a peculiar manner. In the effort to build a sociology of knowledge, we seek to identify the political and social factors that have been moulding international scholarship in the field of displacement and crisis man­agement. The need for a common language and to somehow embrace functional monolingualism has subtly justified the implicit demand to think and present ideas monoculturally. Such an Anglocentric mono­-culture risks emerging as the only valuable and acceptable one in defining “global knowledge” and concepts such as “humanitarianism”. As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh has argued, “exploring the principles and modalities of South–South cooperation, rather than promoting the incorporation of Southern actors into the ‘international humanitarian system’ via the localization agenda, presents a critical opportunity for studies of displace­ment and humanitarianism in the Middle East region”. As a result, the displacement and humanitari­anism literature need to transcend the state paradigm and focus on a larger variety of so­cial and political factors.

Here comes the endeavour of the Southern Responses to Displacement project: while most scholars have examined the work of the United Na­tions and of international institutions in the region, in our chapter for the Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of the Middle East, we instead highlight the need to learn from multilingual literature, especially that produced in the Global South, and from a deeper investigation of the principles and modalities of crisis management as developed by actors from the Global South. From our perspective, such con­siderations, while overcoming the nation-state paradigm, could also drive us toward an actual global sociology of knowledge.

If you find this post of interest, please visit our Thinking through the Global South series and the recommended reading below:

Carpi, E. (2021) Slavery, Lived Realities and Decolonising Forced Migration Histories: A transcript of an interview with Prof. Portia Owusu – Interview with Dr Estella Carpi and Dr Portia Owusu

Carpi, E. (2021) Slavery, Lived Realities and Decolonising Forced Migration Histories: An interview with Prof Portia Owusu (Podcast)

Carpi, E. (2019) Thinking Power Relations across Humanitarian Geographies: Southism as a Mode of Analysis

Carpi, E. (2018) Humanitarianism and Postcoloniality:  A Look at Academic Texts

Carpi, E. (2018) Teaching Humanitarianism:  The Need for a More Responsive Framework:

Carpi, E. (2018) Empires of Inclusion?[FE1] 

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2020) Migration, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Knowledge – An Interview with Juliano Fiori

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2020) Introduction: Recentering the South in Studies of Migration

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2019) Exploring refugees’ conceptualisations of Southern-led humanitarianism

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2019) Histories and spaces of Southern-led responses to displacement

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Thinking through ‘the global South’ and ‘Southern-responses to displacement’: An introduction.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) The Localisation of Aid and Southern-led Responses to Displacement: Beyond instrumentalising local actors

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Southern Responses to Displacement: Background and introduction to our mini blog series. 

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. and Daley, P. (2018) Conceptualising the global South and South–South encounters[FE2] 

Nimer, M. (2019) Reflections on the Political Economy in Forced Migration Research from a ‘Global South’ Perspective

Featured image: (c) El Maks, Boustashy Art photograph, Autumn 2004

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No one wants to be the “Global North”? On being a researcher across the North and South (May, 2019)

No one wants to be the “Global North”? On being a researcher across the North and South

In this blog post I would like to share my personal experiences of carrying out qualitative research in what contemporary scholars call the “Global South” (Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt) and the “Global North” (Australia and the United Kingdom). To convey my message clearly, I adopt the classical political geography of “South” and “North” with the intention of neither confirming these narrow categories nor of universalizing my personal experiences but in order to work towards an honest sociology of knowledge through such peculiar experiences.

In particular, I discuss what I think are some of the emerging behavioral and ethical tendencies in today’s research economy and its main methodologies. On the one hand, the reluctance in the “Southern” environments in recognizing their own tendency to embrace predominant ways of producing knowledge. On the other, the reluctance of “Northern” research entities to acknowledge their own positionality within the global scenario – that is, accepting the fact of conducting research as outsiders and, above all, the sociological harm of pretending localism. The result of these two tendencies is, from my perspective, a globalized impoverished attention to factual awareness, which depends on the personal involvement of researchers in the context they study and the cultivation of the capability to build and rebuild a continual relationship with the subjects and the places studied beyond the duration of fieldwork research.

The “Southern” tendency to perceive the practice of producing research as antithetical or substantially different to the North consistently builds on the universal romanticization of the research produced in the Global South, cutting across the North and the South. Indeed, while the research and academic institutions that I worked for in the Global South tended to believe that their fieldwork quality standards were inherently higher, the fact of being at the mercy of external – and unstable – sources of funding often endangered their existence and alternative ways of working. In these circumstances, fieldwork mostly took place in relatively small timeframes and, likewise, theories needed to be quickly wrapped up, making it difficult to identify any effective counter-culture of knowledge production. Studies on publishing locally and perishing globally have importantly highlighted the material constraints of localizing research. While “Southern” knowledge is barely known and mentioned by North-produced researchers (although it often marks significantly several fields of studies), it is also important to add that, in my own experiences across the Arab world, large segments of upper and middle classes tend to receive their postgraduate education and establish their scholarship in Northern institutions, thereby being trained according to Northern criteria while trying to preserve their reputation of being local researchers. In similar ways, Southern institutions often delegate fieldwork to research assistants who struggle to receive intellectual acknowledgment. (The same acknowledgment that many “Southern” research institutions have been looking for in the international arena, still dominated by Global North’s epistemologies and funding sources). In this regard, I have seen no co-authorships offered to research assistants, who undergo processes of alienation similar to those recently discussed in the context of the institutions of the Global North. Likewise, I have witnessed similarly exploitative relationships which seek to build knowledge upon the anonymity and the belittling of an underpaid workforce, whatever the latter’s passport is.

Despite acknowledging the partially ethnic character of some of these power dynamics – such as European academics versus local researchers in the Arab Levant, mostly when the former lack the necessary linguistic skills and in-depth knowledge of the research settings – I would like to emphasize some nuances. While the global archetype of neoliberal academia certainly does not stem from Southern institutions, largely due to colonial legacies, in my experience I have identified hierarchical and alienating structures of research-making across different cultural patterns of knowledge production.

Dauntingly, ethical research and decolonial methodologies are becoming tokenistic worldwide, turning into a further disenfranchisement of diversely vulnerable researched subjects, such as refugees. In this scenario, the Global North currently promotes itself as a pioneer advocate of ethical research – a phenomenon which has led to a proliferation of publications on the topic, rather than finally aiming for a radical transformation of research and for the uprooting of the vulnerabilities of the researched.

With no intention to bury unequal historical relationships, the intrinsic “non-ethicness” of such structural deficiencies needs to be observed across Norths and Souths. To ethnographers, if quality fieldwork means collecting relevant data, it also needs to mean collecting what matters at a local level and in an appropriate way. Contextual relevance and cultural appropriateness inevitably require generous timeframes. Doing less but long-term research and paying under-explored forms of respect to the researched may be the way to go.

Moreover, a pressing question may center on the tyranny of grants and funding, which is said to dictate the design of today’s projects. To what extent is this the cause of such an unacknowledged sociology of failure in academic research? The present tendency is to design methods that involve an extremely large number of interviews and what I would call the “participatory approach fever”. The result of a misinterpretation of what “participation” should mean is subcontracting scientific evidence to researched subjects overburdened with theoretical expectations and over-theorizations, a tendency which seldom turns out to provide sound empirical evidence. In this vein, Northern-led research not only tends to romanticize the South, which would not be new in postcolonial scholarship, but increasingly invites the South to actively participate in its own romanticization. Affected by “participatory approach fever”, many scholars in the Global North feel urged to depict their work as local, while also missing the fact that sharing their own conscious positionality vis-à-vis the researched would instead be an invaluable point of departure in the effort to avoid ethical and scientific failure. Indeed, such a self-acknowledgment would finally contribute to nuancing the multiple cultures in which research design, data collection, writing, and knowledge production are embedded – cultures that are hardly definable within the categories of “North” and “South”.

In light of these considerations, I ask myself how ethnographic studies can survive without being sociologically relevant and, at times, even culturally appropriate. Subcontracting the production of knowledge either to local researchers or to the researched themselves is certainly not a one-size-fits-all answer. Yet it looks unfeasible for many researchers across the globe to dispose of proper time and funding to conduct research over a longer timeframe and develop a localized understanding of the contexts they wish to study. I identified a similar issue when I realized that some researchers who have a poor command of the local language shy away from hiring an interpreter due to a lack of material means or because they are in an environment that frowns upon social science researchers who lack contextual skills. While peacefully sharing one’s own limits and assets would potentiate empirical analysis overall, everyone wants to be the “voice of the Global South”. Instead, no one wants to be the Global North, impeding a honest sociology of knowledge. Thus, how do we decolonize sociological and anthropological knowledge and, at the same time, the sociology of knowledge, if the drivers of epistemological coloniality, across Norths and Souths, have managed to make themselves invisible?

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Don’t debate, rehabilitate. (by Saad A. Sowayan, March 2014)


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Wed 26 Mar 2014

Tabsir Redux: Don’t debate, rehabilitate

Posted by tabsir under Anthropology/Sociology , Ethics , Terrorism Issue , Islam: Introduction

by Saad A. Sowayan

“Don’t debate religion with fundamentalists: what they need is rehabilitation”

Fundamentalism is a cultural phenomenon, though it dons religious garbs. It is a mode of consciousness shaped by cultural values, not religious principles. Thus we can understand it only if we examine it in its cultural context as a sociological rather than a theological question.

So, I will begin by taking a close look at the social incubators most likely to hatch fundamentalism.

I understand by fundamentalism strong adherence to an archetypal point of view and a fierce conviction of its fundamental truth, to the exclusion of any other alternate idea. Any alternative is resisted by a fundamentalist and treated not as a legitimate substitute stemming from a rational free choice, but as a detrimental antithesis of the fundamental truth of the archetype. The archetype is a model to be emulated and reproduced, not dissected or scrutinized.

Fundamentalism is an emotional, collective phenomenon in that it gives room neither for rational choice nor for individual freedom. No matter what your mind tells you, you are not allowed to leave the fold or swerve from the ‘right path’ followed by the community of the faithful.

Such a mode of thinking and behaving is typically characteristic of archaic, rural and peasant societies, which are generally small, isolated and homogeneous. In such societies, collective sentiments embrace the greater part of the individual sentiments and they have an extreme force as manifested in the severity of the punishment inflicted on those who violate them. Violation of the social imperative arouses strong indignation. To insure conformity and avoid violation, social acts, especially sacred rituals, are characterized by particularization and extreme precision.

Repressive laws, which stress punishment, reveal the force and extent of common sentiments, as well as the particularization of such sentiments. The stronger and more widespread and particularized the collective sentiments, the more crimes there will be, crime being defined simply as the violation of social norms. A crime is viewed as an offense committed by an individual against the collective sentiments, which must be avenged. It is a breach that demands reparation, and the punishment of the guilty is the reparation offered to the feelings of all. This is in contrast to restitutative laws, which aim to restore order rather than avenge the deed.

In pre-industrial, pre-scientific societies – or what anthropologists and sociologists call folk societies – the predominant mode of thinking and behaving is traditional and conservative. The society is held together not so much by complimentary associations and mutual interdependence, but by binding sentiments and common beliefs. It is based not on utilitarian and expedient considerations, but on shared moral principles, on the organization of human sentiments into implicit convictions and judgments as to what is right and wrong.

Submergence of individual personality in the group in traditional societies limits the possibility of free choice and individual preference. Variation is suppressed and any deviation from social norms is condemned. All persons in the community are supposed to be exact replicas of one another, not only in feelings, beliefs and values but also in dress and personal appearance. If any one ever makes the slightest attempt to assert his uniqueness or individuality, he will be subject to censor and derision. This unitarian view is manifested not only in the ethical and religious sphere but also in the social, political and economic spheres.

Traditional societies are characterized by a unitarian and static conception of the universe. Not only do they censure individual variation but they also do not tolerate temporal change. Social change is equated with personal aging. It is not progress and evolution. It is decay and degeneration, always for the worst. According to this conception, the further we go back in time the closer we get to the ideal golden age of pure innocence. It is this nostalgic view of history, which gave rise to the worship of ancestors in religion, as well as the romantic movement in literature.

We have to keep in mind that the idea of cultural evolution and social progress, as well as the idea of individual liberty, are late discoveries in the intellectual development of mankind. The Greeks had their golden age; the Hebrew prophets from Amos to Hosea decried the lavish civilization of David and Solomon; and the Rechabite movement sought to return to the rustic simplicity of nomadism and life in tents. Until two centuries ago, Europeans were still debating the merits of the ancients versus the merits of the moderns. Individual liberty and freedom of choice are the products of the principle of laissez-faire, which is concomitant with capitalism and market economy, themselves products of the industrial revolution, itself a product of the scientific revolution.

If we take a close look at the Muslim World, where fundamentalist thinking predominates, we find that this World consists mostly of pre-industrial, pre-scientific countries which, until recently, were mostly rural, illiterate communities with traditional cultures and conservative values.

Fundamentalists in these countries confuse their pre-scientific, peasant modes of thinking and behaving and propagate them as Islamic dogmas. They want to stop the march of history at the time of the Prophet and his companions, and to force everybody to live as if we were still riding donkeys and living in mud huts. They do not realize that had the Prophet and his companions enjoyed all the modern amenities and conveniences we have at our disposals today they would have made full use of them.

Most of the prejudices and insular ideologies of the fundamentalists are the products of their peasant mentality and rural values, not Islamic teachings. They express their subordination to the past and their frustration with and rejection of present urbanism and modern civilization – with which they cannot cope – through religious discourse.

For a fundamentalist, the real purpose of religion is not to deal with earthly concerns or achieve success and happiness in this world, but to turn away from the transitory world and turn to God to worship Him and please Him and maintain good relations with Him in order to deserve His grace and guarantee a safe passage to heaven after death, which will compensate the devotee for all the self-denials he imposed on himself in this life.

Fundamentalists lay undue stress on the minute details of rituals and overlook the humanitarian and philanthropic message, which had given Islam its universal appeal.

According to the fundamentalist all events in this world – no matter how big or small – are pre-destined by God. No human effort, no matter how great, could change the course of destiny or exercise any control over this material world. The only thing one can do is to submit completely to the will of God and put one’s full trust and faith in His providence. Life on earth has no meaning or value except as a testing ground for religious virtue. One should turn away from the material snares of this evil world and devote oneself completely to the worship of God. The only mission worth pursuing in this worldly existence, for which one could get great dividends in the hereafter, is to bring the lost sheep of the Lord back to the fold, by hook or crook.

You rarely hear fundamentalists talk about programmes to relieve human suffering or to improve health or education or the economic and material conditions of people’s lives. They justify human suffering in this life and explain it away either as testing of faith or as punishment for sins. Their sole purpose for aspiring to rule the world is to stone adulterers and cut the hands of thieves.

Fundamentalism is a form of socio-cultural maladjustment, which, sometimes, becomes a compulsive obsession and may take bizarre manifestations. For an extreme fundamentalist, a difference of one or two inches in the length of your beard or the lower hem of your garment could be the critical criterion that would decide your fate in the hereafter, whether to go to hell or to heaven. This reduces fundamentalism to an aberrant social – rather than religious – phenomenon.

In many cases, what fundamentalists need in order to readjust is social rehabilitation, not to engage them in theological dialogue. The way to deal with fundamentalism is not to kill fundamentalists or throw them in jail. Fundamentalism is like grass, mowing encourages it to grow quicker and thicker. Only through giving them hope and a fair chance to succeed and to realize their ambitions and fulfill their aspirations in this world can we turn fundamentalists into worldly creatures.

The means to achieving this objective is through equality before the law, justice in courts, equity in the distribution of wealth, improving health and education, and other amenities in this life, which would make it worth living – for everybody, not just the privileged few.

Islam has relapsed into a backward state in our times because the whole Muslim World had regressed into backwardness within the last few centuries. During the zenith of the Muslim Civilization, Islam was much more tolerant and accommodating, with much room for intellectual pursuits and material progress. Religion is a social product and a social institution; it must be in tune with its social milieu and address the needs of the time, otherwise it looses its force and becomes an obstacle to human happiness and wellbeing. Islam will regain its vitality and universal appeal only when the Muslim World regains its lost role as a leader in historical progress and a builder of civilization.

[This post was originally published on Saudi Debate, June 11, 2007]

[Tabsir Redux is a reposting of earlier posts on the blog, since memories are fickle and some things deserve a second viewing. This post was originally made on October 7, 2007]

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