Posts Tagged With: Israel

Winking at Humanitarian Neutrality: The Liminal Politics of the State in Lebanon (June, 2019)

What does it happen when local residents of the Beirut southern suburbs speak of the Lebanese state offering Lebanon “on a silver tray” and Syrian refugees in the northern region of Akkar mention the Lebanese state as a repressive political actor allied with supposedly neutral humanitarian agencies which manage their everyday life?

In this article, just published in the main Canadian Anthropological journal Anthropologica 61(1): 83-96 (University of Toronto Press), I rethink liminality in anthropology and I identify in liminality the behavioural politics of the Lebanese state, whose enmity is perceived by refugees and local citizens, both frustrated by failed attempts at befriending the central state throughout Lebanon’s history.

Here below you can find the abstract in English and French, as well as the link from where to access my article.

Abstract: Drawing on the July 2006 Israel–Lebanon War in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Syrian refugee influx into the villages of Akkar in northern Lebanon, I suggest that the Lebanese state aspires to officially assert itself as a liminal space in a bid to survive crises and preserve its political capital, therefore aborting the attempts made by citizens and refugees to leave such liminality. I look at how professed state liminality meets with humanitarian neutrality, which is a principle of several international humanitarian agencies that assisted the internally displaced in 2006 and Syrian refugees from 2011 in Lebanon. Although in anthropology liminality has mostly been approached as anti-structural and an embodiment of the mar-gins, by proceeding from people’s perception of state enmity and their frustrated aspirations to befriend the state, I suggest that state liminality rather captures the structural peculiarity of the Lebanese state’s agency and violent presence, made of repressive and neglectful politics.

Keywords: refugees, Lebanon, humanitarianism, welfare, NGOs

Résumé : Partant de la guerre israélo-libanaise de juillet 2006 dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth et de l’afflux de réfugiés syriens dans les villages du Akkar au nord du Liban, j’émets l’hypothèse que l’État libanais cherche à s’affirmer officielle-ment comme espace liminaire afin de survivre aux crises et de préserver son capital politique, faisant ainsi échec aux efforts de citoyens et de réfugiés pour quitter cette liminarité. J’exa-mine l’intersection de la liminarité étatique proclamée et de la neutralité humanitaire, ce dernier principe étant mis en avant par de nombreuses agences humanitaires internationales qui ont assisté les déplacés internes en 2006 et qui accompagnent les réfugiés syriens au Liban depuis 2011. Si en anthropologie la liminarité est généralement abordée comme un phénomène anti-structurel et comme une incarnation des marges, je m’ap-puie sur la perception qu’ont les gens de l’inimitié étatique et de leurs aspirations frustrées à se rapprocher de l’État pour avancer que la liminarité étatique permet plutôt d’appréhender la particularité structurelle de l’agencéité et de la présence violente propres à l’État libanais, lesquelles sont marquées par une politique conjointe de répression et d’abandon.

Mots clés : réfugiés, Liban, humanitaire, protection sociale, ONG

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Syria’s rebels not unified on US strike

An article I wrote for Al-Monitor on the conflicting stances of several Syrian rebel brigades on the US intervention…

(Ihfad al-Rasul and Ihfad al-Ghouta are actually Ahfad al-Rasul and Ahfad al-Ghouta: my mistake)

Syria’s Rebels Not Unified on US Strike



AMUDA, Syria — As the horizon is still cloudy concerning the date and details of the announced Western strike on Syria — officially intended to punish the regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons on Aug. 21 in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta — the rebels on the ground are divided on whether the intervention will benefit their cause.

Those who support foreign action are actually placing their hopes on a wider involvement than the limited punitive strike mentioned by US officials and aimed at deterring further use of chemical weapons.
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Inside Hezbollah’s thirty-year struggle against Israel (May 2013)

Warriors of God, Blanford on Hezbollah’s 30-year struggle against Israel

 3 MAGGIO 2013

(di Estella Carpi*). The last work of American journalist Nicholas Blanford takes the form of an autobiography about his own life as a reporter, having the privilege of being constantly immersed in the insider world of whom he explores.

Blanford begins his book with a historical excursus of Hezbollah’s roots and Imam Musa al Sadr’s legacies in the ongoing Shi’a ethics: such as the conception of armaments as adornments of men. Men who want vengeance and revolt against tyranny.

Throughout the ‘80s and the ‘90s, the growing conviction that the only way to establish justice is to organize a revolution and use weapons, as Musa al Sadr suggested, is also confirmed by Lebanese scholar Mona Fawaz, that has observed how Hezbollah instead does not speak anymore of mahrumun – term initially assigned by Musa al Sadr, “the deprived” – rather mustadafun, term contained in the Holy Koran, meaning “the weakened”, which opens the door to change more easily than the former term.

Hezbollah, in fact, fosters the Shiite refusal of victimization and the status of passive oppressed, long date label of the Shiite community that is alleged to reflect their internalized existential status, culturally expressed through the annual ceremony of ‘Ashura, which commemorates Imam Hussein’s death.

The author highlights the position of Hezbollah as a Trojan horse carrying Iran’s influence into the majority Sunni Arab Middle East, who used to name the Shi’a “metwali”, as not grown in an urban environment unlike Sunnis in Lebanon’s history.

Blanford seems to look for political objectivity, in the full hope of its feasibility, by representing facts in their faithful chronological order, factual reality and endemic ways of living them. The several ethnographic snapshots of the detailed military operations, including flashbacks that focus on the evolution of particular war strategies and weapons used by both sides, leak an American-style taste for spectacularization of war scenarios or sensationalism of some scenes whose the author is the narrator (i.e. when he finally discovers one of Hezbollah’s bunkers after a seven month search).

For instance, Blanford reports the 16th October 1983 incursion of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into the ‘Ashura ceremony in Nabatiye, contending that the trucks made the “mistake” of driving into the throng and inducing the celebrant Shi’a to throw stones. The Israelis are described as “frightened” in that episode. He seems to be committed to proving his will of embracing both sides’ interpretation in the name of objective historical truth.

To the same extent, however, he highlights where Israeli interests have resided behind all aggressive attacks against Lebanon, such as the annexation of Arnoun in 1998 to the Israeli occupied zone, with the alleged purpose of protecting the IDF and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) from Hezbollah’s attacks against the Beaufort castle.

With respect to Augustus Norton’s representation in the chronicles of the struggles between the two Lebanese Shi’a parties Harakat Amal and Hezbollah, Blanford reminds that South Lebanon people, especially Christians, actually had no other choice than trading with the Israelis. He therefore discards the “natural” friendship and harmony between the two sides that are instead perceivable in Norton’s work.

Yet, Blanford puts in the foreground the local differentiation of the Islamic Resistance as experienced and deployed by Palestinians and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and, on the other hand, promoted and lived by the Shi’a, once spiritually led by Musa al Sadr, and, later, by Fadlallah, carrying ideological innovations.

As evidence of this local differentiation of the Islamic Resistance, Amal used to view the PLO as occupants and, thus, used to be compliant with the IDF during the Lebanese “war of the camps” (1985-1989). On the contrary, Fadlallah absorbed the Palestinian cause into the Shi’a struggle for social justice and equality, in the full respect of all communities.

While narrating the gradual emergence of a common Shi’a political sphere, Blanford unravels the roots of such Shi’a cosmopolitanism between Iraq (where Fadlallah was born and every Shiite influent leader studied), Iran (homeland of Musa al Sadr and cradle of Shi’ism), and Lebanon (“action” scenario of every Shi’a spiritual leader).

In some pages, to my mind, Blanford’s desirability of historical accuracy gets lost in a sort of self-focusing, which paradoxically unearths his de-empathization with the reported events, giving up an emotional inner perspective. He makes an exception when he gets deep into the 2006 war, in which all his dismay is perceivable among the pages that are dedicated to his experience between the displaced and the families of the martyrs.

He describes Hezbollah as a special guerrilla force, although not yet as a fully-fledged conventional army. In this section, Blanford also mentions the reiteration of forced evacuations to which these miserable people have been doomed throughout the years, as though their suffering were written in an inescapable destiny.

One of the stories that rarely finds room in historical analyses on South Lebanon, is the narrated sense of unremitting anxiety and isolation that pervaded the South Lebanese Army in the border zone – where they used to cooperate with Israel – once they became aware that their defeat was looming due to Hezbollah’s strength and steadfastness.

In the domestic political scenario, Blanford brilliantly smashes the myth of a polarization between Hezbollah and Hariri and between the current March 8 and 14 coalitions, as well as of an antagonism of interests between Syria and Israel, showing therefore the schizophrenic state behaviors of all parts involved.

The Syrian regime is instead represented as a big Leviathan, never confronting Israel, never accepting Lebanon’s independence and practically supervising all negotiations between these two countries, like in the case of the Shebaa Farms at the Lebanese southern border and their territorial dispute. While denouncing the machiavellic moves of all states implied in Hezbollah’s affairs and plans, the author succeeds in representing the things from within just from a macro-political perspective, since he reports, most of the time, the official discourses and private conversations that he had with the members of the Party of God.

What would have been interesting to find in this insightful piece of work is a – even just hinted – view of common local residents, in order to find out how they make meaning of these events. This was not probably the goal that Blanford meant to achieve, in the attempt to blur the lines between the military and the civilian in Hezbollah’s realm. Struggling between journalistic style, autobiography and essay-style objectivity, a reporter that has been living in Lebanon for decades, nonetheless, would have been expected to abdicate his self-seeking, particularly in the second section of the book.


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No confessionalisation, no “party” (April 2013)


(“No to confessionalism”. Picture taken by Estella Carpi, Downtown, Beirut, 7th January 2013)

I have just got through yesterday’s article “The Cold Front” on NowLebanon: one of the worst aetiological interpretations of the 2006 war (between Israel and Lebanon) I’ve ever come across.

Abdul-Hussain, the article’s author based in Washington, thinks he can brilliantly explain how the July war has broken out: Hezbollah is the only one that has interests in opening fire first. Israel has not. Not even for a preemptive war.

Going beyond these quite arguable assumptions on the 2006 war, the author, in a bid to denounce the artificial construction of the Zionist enemy, ends up creating a new construction by merely replacing the previous one: the chronic confessionalisation of war commitments and inputs. In the case of Hezbollah, therefore, he denies the engagement of the party in the Palestinian issue by portraying the latter as a sunni cause that Shiites would have no interest for. The author does recognise the big hoax that the Axis of Resistance implies about protecting Palestinians. It is in fact enough to spend some time in the Palestinian camps throughout Lebanon and in the shiite areas stricken by the 2006 war, to find out that the idea of Islamic Resistance should be unpacked into several conceptions and experiences, highly diversified among Lebanese Shiites and Palestinians in Lebanon.

I also agree with his need for unearthing the hypocrisy behind the supposed protection of the Palestinians – bombed by the Asad regime and even fought by Hezbollah in Lebanese history (and we could also mention a lacking homogenised rhetoric around the “value” of Resistance in the everyday narratives of people from the two groups).

I categorically refuse, however, to adopt the confessional lens to justify Hezbollah’s actual disengagement in the Palestinian cause, in that “there is nothing shiite about Palestine”, as the author contends.

In a similar vein, Abdul-Hussain seems to justify the absence, the neglect and the shameful corruption of the Siniora’s government throughout the days of the July war, by identifying such a (failed) state behaviour with Hezbollah’s anti-sunni propaganda among “its people”. And it is exactly in the form of a “from anti-Israel to anti-sunni struggle” that Hezbollah’s evolutive behaviour is interpreted by Abdul-Hussain.

All these are clear signs that old epistemological confessionalisation is still hard to die. Why on earth, in order to dismantle regional myths about political balances, should we need to resort to confessional explanations?

(Estella Carpi)

P.S. My sources about the corruption of the Lebanese government and its total military “laissez-faire” – apart from hundreds of local people’s accounts – are the unofficial declarations of the governmental ministers and of the ex PM Fouad Siniora contained in the Wikileaks cables (July-September 2006).


April 15, 2013

The Cold Front

How long will the Israeli-Lebanese border remain peaceful?

A Lebanese soldier (right) and a member of UNIFIL stand guard on the Isreal-Lebanon border. (AFP)

The Lebanese live on the edge. They expect war all the time, whether it spills over from Syria, or is provoked by a strike on Iran, or is predicated by hot tempers reaching a boiling point and Sunnis and Shiites take their fight to the streets. One front, however, looks colder than usual. For the first time in decades, Lebanon’s southern border is quiet, and neither Hezbollah nor Israel are interested in escalation.

UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the war and now governs the peace, is flimsy on paper, but has proven durable on the ground, giving the region its second-longest stretch of calm with since the creation of Israel. Tel Aviv, therefore, has no interest in launching war against Hezbollah, preemptive or otherwise.

So for war to breakout, Hezbollah will have to open fire first, and many believe that because Hezbollah’s decisions are inspired by its patrons in Tehran, it will only go to war when it is instructed to. But even for a regional proxy like Hezbollah, all politics is local.

In Lebanon, the Shiites support Hezbollah, but not unconditionally. The 2006 war jeopardized Hezbollah’s standing among the Shiites who saw their villages razed. Iran came to Hezbollah’s rescue by shipping bags of cash that were doled out to hard-hit families and individuals.

During the 14 weeks that followed the end of the war, Hezbollah tried to contain Shiite anger by dispersing cash. But Shiite frustration proved insurmountable even with Iran’s petrodollars.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah thus understood that while most of his supporters were blindly following for benefits, the majority of Shiites were not particularly dedicated to liberating Palestine, historically a Sunni issue that Iran’s Ruhollah Khomeini tried to exploit in order to spread his revolution to Sunni Arab countries.

Yet despite Khomeini’s efforts, there is nothing Shiite about Palestine; no Shiite imams or their families ever set foot or are buried there, unlike in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Even the third-holiest site in Islam, Jerusalem’s Omar’s Mosque, carries a name the Shiites abhor and never give to their children.

Without links to Palestine and with the 2006 inferno, the Shiites found it counterintuitive to keep fighting Israel, a lesson that was not lost on Hezbollah.

During the 2006 war, an embattled Nasrallah became all-encompassing in his speeches, especially as Shiites took refuge in non-Shiite neighborhoods. His allies praised Sunni Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, calling his government a “resistance cabinet” for its diplomatic role in shaping 1701.

But after the war, the Shiites had a change of heart, and Hezbollah had to follow.

In December, Hezbollah started a sit-in in downtown Beirut demanding Siniora’s resignation, blaming him for the ills that had befallen the Shiites during the war and condemning what they called the corrupt and deliberately slow relief and reconstruction efforts. Hezbollah was looking for a scapegoat, and the Sunnis fit the bill in a way that resonated with the majority of the Shiites.

Until then, Lebanon’s Sunnis had accused Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad of killing their leader Rafiq Hariri in 2005. But with the rise of Shiite anti-Sunnism, Hezbollah displaced the Assad regime as the Sunni’s number one enemy.

Hezbollah’s transformation from ‘anti-Israel’ to ‘anti-Sunni’ was complete, with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011.

Even though Nasrallah argued that his support for Assad was because of the latter’s alignment with the ‘resistance axis,’ Nasrallah never explained why the Shiite militia in Syria was called the Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas brigade, a reference to Imam Hussain’s half-brother who was killed with him in Karbala in 680. If Hezbollah was fighting in Syria for resistance reasons, then why not call its fighting force after someone who had died fighting Israel, not the Sunnis?

Meanwhile from a logistics perspective, the Syrian conflict has strained Hezbollah resources to the extent that it makes sense for Nasrallah to favor extending the freeze on his southern border.

But Hezbollah’s transformation does not mean it has given up on fighting Israel, only it won’t be fighting Israel the ‘Palestine usurper,’ but Israel the partner in America’s ‘World Oppressors Inc,’ which Iran and Hezbollah have been dedicated to fighting since 1979.

As such, Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel is being transformed from direct confrontation to clandestine operations. The Borgas bombing and Hezbollah’s foiled attempts in Cyprus, among other less-publicized attempts, are only the beginning.

Hezbollah’s international network is not as formidable as its militia. But if history is any guide, the party learns fast. It might soon cultivate assets and form cells, around the world, to be used for attacks in due time.

Should such attacks invite Israeli reprisal across the border, like those against Palestinians in the 1960s and 70s, then engaging Israel in direct war could become justified in the eyes of the party’s Shiite base.

But no such scenario seems in the making. The Lebanese-Israeli border will remain cold, at least for now.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is the Washington Bureau Chief of Kuwaiti newspaper Alrai. He tweets @hahussain.

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Muftah » Israel’s Bombing of Syria: It’s Domestic Politics, Baby

In the wake of what Bassam Haddad has brilliantly called IAN (Israel’s Asad Nostalgia).

Happy reading!

Muftah » Israel’s Bombing of Syria: It’s Domestic Politics, Baby.

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Judith Butler remarks on the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions Movement (March 2013)

BDSThe Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions movement (BDS) has been created back in 2005 by 171 Palestinian non-governmental organisations, that were aiming at achieving self-determination through non-violent punitive measures against the state of Israel for its legal violations on a domestic and international level.

The BDS issue has recently come again to the fore among some university students in Australia – where I’m currently based – since the University of New South Wales will apparently host soon on its campus the chocolate shop chain “Max Brenner”. This chocolate store is known to be owned by the Israeli conglomerate Strauss Group, which provides “material assistance” for the Israeli Defence Forces, and specifically for the Golani and Givati brigades. The IDF carry out crimes on a vast scale against the Palestinian population and repeatedly bypass International Law. The 2008-09 Cast Lead Operation in the Gaza Strip is the most blatant example. 

I have just come across this well structured discourse that Professor Judith Butler held at Brooklyn College last February. I thank Butler for clarifying the BDS principles, its way of acting, and the fact that the main goal of this movement is not at all to foster anti-Jewish hate speech; rather, to become unnecessary in the sphere of a peaceful coexistence. The BDS movement merely aims at demolishing the structural conditions of inequality, containment and dispossession, in the common interest of both peoples. 

I invite you all to read it here below at full to refresh the huge importance of this cause.

(Estella Carpi)

Judith Butler’s Remarks to Brooklyn College on BDS

February 7, 2013

Editors Note: Despite a campaign to silence them, philosophers Judith Butler and Omar Barghouti spoke at Brooklyn College on Thursday night. In an exclusive, The Nation presents the text of Butler’s remarks.

Usually one starts by saying that one is glad to be here, but I cannot say that it has been a pleasure anticipating this event. What a Megillah! I am, of course, glad that the event was not cancelled, and I understand that it took a great deal of courage and a steadfast embrace of principle for this event to happen at all. I would like personally to thank all those who took this opportunity to reaffirm the fundamental principles of academic freedom, including the following organizations: the Modern Language Association, the National Lawyers Guild, the New York ACLU, the American Association of University Professors, the Professional Staff Congress (the union for faculty and staff in the CUNY system), the New York Times editorial team, the offices of Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Governor Andrew Cuomo and Brooklyn College President Karen Gould whose principled stand on academic freedom has been exemplary.

About the Author

Judith Butler
Judith Butler is a professor in the Rhetoric and Comparative Literature department at UC Berkeley. She is the…

Also by the Author

As the UC Berkeley Student Senate votes to divest from two companies that profit from Israel’s occupation of Palestine, the noted philosopher reminds us of what’s at stake.

Judith Butler’s April 1 “Guantánamo Limbo” intelligently discusses the failure of the Geneva Conventions to take account of “prisoners of the new war” and links this failure to its flawed premises regarding states.

The principle of academic freedom is designed to make sure that powers outside the university, including government and corporations, are not able to control the curriculum or intervene in extra-mural speech. It not only bars such interventions, but it also protects those platforms in which we might be able to reflect together on the most difficult problems. You can judge for yourself whether or not my reasons for lending my support to this movement are good ones. That is, after all, what academic debate is about. It is also what democratic debate is about, which suggests that open debate about difficult topics functions as a meeting point between democracy and the academy. Instead of asking right away whether we are for or against this movement, perhaps we can pause just long enough to find out what exactly this is, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, and why it is so difficult to speak about this.

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I am not asking anyone to join a movement this evening. I am not even a leader of this movement or part of any of its governing committee, even though the New York Times tried to anoint me the other day—I appreciated their subsequent retraction, and I apologize to my Palestinian colleagues for their error. The movement, in fact, has been organized and led by Palestinians seeking rights of political self-determination, including Omar Barghouti, who was invited first by the Students for Justice in Palestine, after which I was invited to join him. At the time I thought it would be very much like other events I have attended, a conversation with a few dozen student activists in the basement of a student center. So, as you can see, I am surprised and ill-prepared for what has happened.

Omar will speak in a moment about what the BDS movement is, its successes and its aspirations. But I would like briefly to continue with the question, what precisely are we doing here this evening? I presume that you came to hear what there is to be said, and so to test your preconceptions against what some people have to say, to see whether your objections can be met and your questions answered. In other words, you come here to exercise critical judgment, and if the arguments you hear are not convincing, you will be able to cite them, to develop your opposing view and to communicate that as you wish. In this way, your being here this evening confirms your right to form and communicate an autonomous judgment, to demonstrate why you think something is true or not, and you should be free to do this without coercion and fear. These are your rights of free expression, but they are, perhaps even more importantly, your rights to education, which involves the freedom to hear, to read and to consider any number of viewpoints as part of an ongoing public deliberation on this issue. Your presence here, even your support for the event, does not assume agreement among us. There is no unanimity of opinion here; indeed, achieving unanimity is not the goal.

The arguments made against this very meeting took several forms, and they were not always easy for me to parse. One argument was that BDS is a form of hate speech, and it spawned a set of variations: it is hate speech directed against either the State of Israel or Israeli Jews, or all Jewish people. If BDS is hate speech, then it is surely not protected speech, and it would surely not be appropriate for any institution of higher learning to sponsor or make room for such speech. Yet another objection, sometimes uttered by the same people who made the first, is that BDS does qualify as a viewpoint, but as such, ought to be presented only in a context in which the opposing viewpoint can be heard as well. There was yet a qualification to this last position, namely, that no one can have a conversation on this issue in the US that does not include a certain Harvard professor, but that spectacular argument was so self-inflationary and self-indicting, that I could only respond with astonishment.

So in the first case, it is not a viewpoint (and so not protected as extra-mural speech), but in the second instance, it is a viewpoint, presumably singular, but cannot be allowed to be heard without an immediate refutation. The contradiction is clear, but when people engage in a quick succession of contradictory claims such as these, it is usually because they are looking for whatever artillery they have at their disposal to stop something from happening. They don’t much care about consistency or plausibility. They fear that if the speech is sponsored by an institution such as Brooklyn College, it will not only be heard, but become hearable, admitted into the audible world. The fear is that viewpoint will become legitimate, which means only that someone can publicly hold such a view and that it becomes eligible for contestation. A legitimate view is not necessarily right, but it is not ruled out in advance as hate speech or injurious conduct. Those who did not want any of these words to become sayable and audible imagined that the world they know and value will come to an end if such words are uttered, as if the words themselves will rise off the page or fly out of the mouth as weapons that will injure, maim or even kill, leading to irreversibly catastrophic consequences. This is why some people claimed that if this event were held, the two-state solution would be imperiled—they attributed great efficacy to these words. And yet others said it would lead to the coming of a second Holocaust—an unimaginable remark to which I will nevettheless return. One might say that all of these claims were obvious hyperbole and should be dismissed as such. But it is important to understand that they are wielded for the purpose of intimidation, animating the spectre of traumatic identification with the Nazi oppressor: if you let these people speak, you yourself will be responsible for heinous crimes or for the destruction of a state, or the Jewish people. If you listen to the words, you will become complicit in war crimes.

And yet all of us here have to distinguish between the right to listen to a point of view and the right to concur or dissent from that point of view; otherwise, public discourse is destroyed by censorship. I wonder, what is the fantasy of speech nursed by the censor? There must be enormous fear behind the drive to censorship, but also enormous aggression, as if we were all in a war where speech has suddenly become artillery. Is there another way to approach language and speech as we think about this issue? Is it possible that some other use of words might forestall violence, bring about a general ethos of non-violence, and so enact, and open onto, the conditions for a public discourse that welcomes and shelters disagreement, even disarray?

The Boycott Divestment and Sanctions movement is, in fact, a non-violent movement; it seeks to use established legal means to achieve its goals; and it is, interestingly enough, the largest Palestinian civic movement at this time. That means that the largest Palestinian civic movement is a non-violent one that justifies its actions through recourse to international law. Further, I want to underscore that this is also a movement whose stated core principles include the opposition to every form of racism, including both state-sponsored racism and anti-Semitism. Of course, we can debate what anti-Semitism is, in what social and political forms it is found. I myself am sure that the election of self-identified national socialists to the Greek parliament is a clear sign of anti-Semitism; I am sure that the recirculation of Nazi insignia and rhetoric by the National Party of Germany is a clear sign of anti-Semitism. I am also sure that the rhetoric and actions of Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are often explicitly anti-Semitic, and that some forms of Palestinian opposition to Israel do rely on anti-Semitic slogans, falsehoods and threats. All of these forms of anti-Semitism are to be unconditionally opposed. And I would add, they have to be opposed in the same way and with the same tenacity that any form of racism has to be opposed, including state racism.

But still, it is left to us to ask, why would a non-violent movement to achieve basic political rights for Palestinians be understood as anti-Semitic? Surely, there is nothing about the basic rights themselves that constitute a problem. They include equal rights of citizenship for current inhabitants; the end to the occupation, and the rights of unlawfully displaced persons to return to their lands and gain restitution for their losses. We will surely speak about each of these three principles this evening. But for now, I want to ask, why would a collective struggle to use economic and cultural forms of power to compel the enforcement of international laws be considered anti-Semitic? It would be odd to say that they are anti-Semitic to honor internationally recognized rights to equality, to be free of occupation and to have unlawfully appropriated land and property restored. I know that this last principle makes many people uneasy, but there are several ways of conceptualizing how the right of return might be exercised lawfully such that it does not entail further dispossession (and we will return to this issue).

For those who say that exercising internationally recognized rights is anti-Semitic, or becomes anti-Semitic in this context, they must mean either that a) its motivation is anti-Semitic or b) its effects are anti-Semitic. I take it that no one is actually saying that the rights themselves are anti-Semitic, since they have been invoked by many populations in the last decades, including Jewish people dispossessed and displaced in the aftermath of the second world war. Is there really any reason we should not assume that Jews, just like any other people, would prefer to live in a world where such internationally recognized rights are honored? It will not do to say that international law is the enemy of the Jewish people, since the Jewish people surely did not as a whole oppose the Nuremburg trials, or the development of human rights law. In fact, there have always been Jews working alongside non-Jews—not only to establish the courts and codes of international law, but in the struggle to dismantle colonial regimes, opposing any and all legal and military powers that seek systematically to undermine the conditions of political self-determination for any population.

Only if we accept the proposition that the state of Israel is the exclusive and legitimate representative of the Jewish people would a movement calling for divestment, sanctions and boycott against that state be understood as directed against the Jewish people as a whole. Israel would then be understood as co-extensive with the Jewish people. There are two major problems with this view. First, the state of Israel does not represent all Jews, and not all Jews understand themselves as represented by the state of Israel. Secondly, the state of Israel should be representing allof its population equally, regardless of whether or not they are Jewish, regardless of race, religion or ethnicity.

So the first critical and normative claim that follows is that the state of Israel should be representing the diversity of its own population. Indeed, nearly 25 percent of Israel’s population is not Jewish, and most of those are Palestinian, although some of them are Bedouins and Druze. If Israel is to be considered a democracy, the non-Jewish population deserves equal rights under the law, as do the Mizrachim (Arab Jews) who represent over 30 percent of the population. Presently, there are at least twenty laws that privilege Jews over Arabs within the Israeli legal system. The 1950 Law of Return grants automatic citizenship rights to Jews from anywhere in the world upon request, while denying that same right to Palestinians who were forcibly dispossessed of their homes in 1948 or subsequently as the result of illegal settlements and redrawn borders. Human Rights Watch has compiled an extensive study of Israel’s policy of “separate, not equal” schools for Palestinian children. Moreover, as many as 100 Palestinian villages in Israel are still not recognized by the Israeli government, lacking basic services (water, electricity, sanitation, roads, etc.) from the government. Palestinians are barred from military service, and yet access to housing and education still largely depends on military status. Families are divided by the separation wall between the West Bank and Israel, with few forms of legal recourse to rights of visitation and reunification. The Knesset debates the “transfer” of the Palestinian population to the West Bank, and the new loyalty oath requires that anyone who wishes to become a citizen pledge allegiance to Israel as Jewish and democratic, thus eliding once again the non-Jewish population and binding the full population to a specific and controversial, if not contradictory, version of democracy.

The second point, to repeat, is that the Jewish people extend beyond the state of Israel and the ideology of political Zionism. The two cannot be equated. Honestly, what can really be said about “the Jewish people” as a whole? Is it not a lamentable sterotype to make large generalizations about all Jews, and to presume they all share the same political commitments? They—or, rather, we—occupy a vast spectrum of political views, some of which are unconditionally supportive of the state of Israel, some of which are conditionally supportive, some are skeptical, some are exceedingly critical, and an increasing number, if we are to believe the polls in this country, are indifferent. In my view, we have to remain critical of anyone who posits a single norm that decides rights of entry into the social or cultural category determining as well who will be excluded. Most categories of identity are fraught with conflicts and ambiguities; the effort to suppress the complexity of the category of “Jewish” is thus a political move that seeks to yoke a cultural identity to a specific Zionist position. If the Jew who struggles for justice for Palestine is considered to be anti-Semitic, if any number of internationals who have joined thus struggle from various parts of the world are also considered anti-Semitic and if Palestinians seeking rights of political self-determination are so accused as well, then it would appear that no oppositional move that can take place without risking the accusation of anti-Semitism. That accusation becomes a way of discrediting a bid for self-determination, at which point we have to ask what political purpose the radical mis-use of that accusation has assumed in the stifling of a movement for political self-determination.

When Zionism becomes co-extensive with Jewishness, Jewishness is pitted against the diversity that defines democracy, and if I may say so, betrays one of the most important ethical dimensions of the diasporic Jewish tradition, namely, the obligation of co-habitation with those different from ourselves. Indeed, such a conflation denies the Jewish role in broad alliances in the historical struggle for social and political justice in unions, political demands for free speech, in socialist communities, in the resistance movement in World War II, in peace activism, the Civil Rights movement and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. It also demeans the important struggles in which Jews and Palestinians work together to stop the wall, to rebuild homes, to document indefinite detention, to oppose military harassment at the borders and to oppose the occupation and to imagine the plausible scenarios for the Palestinian right to return.

The point of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement is to withdraw funds and support from major financial and cultural institutions that support the operations of the Israeli state and its military. The withdrawal of investments from companies that actively support the military or that build on occupied lands, the refusal to buy products that are made by companies on occupied lands, the withdrawal of funds from investment accounts that support any of these activities, a message that a growing number of people in the international community will not be complicit with the occupation. For this goal to be realized, it matters that there is a difference between those who carry Israeli passports and the state of Israel, since the boycott is directed only toward the latter. BDS focuses on state agencies and corporations that build machinery designed to destroy homes, that build military materiel that targets populations, that profit from the occupation, that are situated illegally on Palestinian lands, to name a few.

BDS does not discriminate against individuals on the basis of their national citizenship. I concede that not all versions of BDS have been consistent on this point in the past, but the present policy confirms this principle. I myself oppose any form of BDS that discriminates against individuals on the basis of their citizenship. Others may interpret the boycott differently, but I have no problem collaborating with Israeli scholars and artists as long as we do not participate in any Israeli institution or have Israeli state monies support our collaborative work. The reason, of course, is that the academic and cultural boycott seeks to put pressure on all those cultural institutions that have failed to oppose the occupation and struggle for equal rights and the rights of the dispossessed, all those cultural institutions that think it is not their place to criticize their government for these practices, all of them that understand themselves to be above or beyond this intractable political condition. In this sense, they do contribute to an unacceptable status quo. And those institutions should know why international artists and scholars refuse to come when they do, just as they also need to know the conditions under which people will come. When those cultural institutions (universities, art centers, festivals) were to take such a stand, that would be the beginning of the end of the boycott (let’s remember that the goal of any boycott, divestment and sanctions movement is to become obsolete and unnecessary; once conditions of equality and justice are achieved, the rationale for BDS falls away, and in this sense achieving the just conditions for the dissolution of the movement is its very aim).

In some ways, the argument between BDS and its opponents centers on the status of international law. Which international laws are to be honored, and how can they be enforced. International law cannot solve every political conflict, but political conflicts that fully disregard international law usually only get worse as a result. We know that the government of the state of Israel has voiced its skepticism about international law, repeatedly criticizing the United Nations as a biased institution, even bombing its offices in Gaza. Israel also became the first country to withhold cooperation from a UN review of its human rights practices scheduled last week in Geneva (New York Times, 1/29/13). I think it is fair to call this a boycott of the UN on the part of the state of Israel. Indeed, one hears criticism of the ineffectiveness of the UN on both sides, but is that a reason to give up on the global human rights process altogether? There are good reasons to criticize the human rights paradigm, to be sure, but for now, I am only seeking to make the case that BDS is not a destructive or hateful movement. It appeals to international law precisely under conditions in which the international community, the United Nations included, neighboring Arab states, human rights courts, the European Union, The United States and the UK, have all failed effectively to rectify the manifest injustices in Palestine. Boycott, divestment and the call for sanctions are popular demands that emerge precisely when the international community has failed to compel a state to abide by its own norms.

Let us consider, then, go back to the right of return, which constitutes the controversial third prong of the BDS platform. The law of return is extended to all of us who are Jewish who live in the diaspora, which means that were it not for my politics, I too would be eligible to become a citizen of that state. At the same time, Palestinians in need of the right of return are denied the same rights? If someone answers that “Jewish demographic advantage” must be maintained, one can query whether Jewish demographic advantage is policy that can ever be reconciled with democratic principles. If one responds to that with “the Jews will only be safe if they retain their majority status,” the response has to be that any state will surely engender an opposition movement when it seeks to maintain a permanent and disenfranchised minority within its borders, fails to offer reparation or return to a population driven from their lands and homes, keeps over four million people under occupation without rights of mobility, due process and political self-determination, and another 1.6 million under siege in Gaza, rationing of food, administering unemployment, blocking building materials to restore bombed homes and institutions, intensifying vulnerability to military bombardment resulting in widespread injury and death.

If we conclude that those who participate in such an opposition movement do so because they hate the Jews, we have surely failed to recognize that this is an opposition to oppression, to the multi-faceted dimensions of a militarized form of settler colonialism that has entailed subordination, occupation and dispossession. Any group would oppose that condition, and the state that maintains it, regardless of whether that state is identified as a Jewish state or any other kind. Resistance movements do not discriminate against oppressors, though sometimes the language of the movement can use discriminatory language, and that has to be opposed. However, it is surely cynical to claim that the only reason a group organizes to oppose its own oppression is that it bears an inexplicable prejudice or racist hatred against those who oppress them. We can see the torque of this argument and the absurd conclusions to which it leads: if the Palestinians did not hate the Jews, they would accept their oppression by the state of Israel! If they resist, it is a sign of anti-Semitism!

This kind of logic takes us to one of the traumatic and affective regions of this conflict. There are reasons why much of the global media and prevailing political discourses cannot accept that a legitimate opposition to inequality, occupation, and dispossession is very different from anti-Semitism. After all, we cannot rightly argue that if a state claiming to represent the Jewish people engages in these manifestly illegal activities, it is therefore justified on the grounds that the Jews have suffered atrociously and therefore have special needs to be exempt from international norms. Such illegal acts are never justified, no matter who is practicing them.

At the same time, one must object to some of the language used by Hamas to refer to the state of Israel, where very often the state of Israel is itself conflated with the Jews, and where the actions of the state reflect on the nature of the Jews. This is clearly anti-Semitism and must be opposed. But BDS is not the same as Hamas, and it is simply ignorant to argue that all Palestinian organizations are the same. In the same vein, those who wrote to me recently to say that BDS is the same as Hamas is the same as the Nazis are involved in fearful and aggressive forms of association that assume that any effort to make distinctions is naïve and foolish. And so we see how the conflations such as these lead to bitter and destructive consequences. What if we slowed down enough to think and to distinguish—what political possibilities might then open?

And it brings us to yet another outcry that we heard in advance of our discussion here this evening. That was BDS is the coming of a second holocaust. I believe we have to be very careful when anyone makes use of the Holocaust in this way and for this purpose, since if the term becomes a weapon by which we seek to stigmatize those with opposing political viewpoints, then we have first of all dishonored the slaughter of over 6 million Jewish people, and another 4 million gypsies, gay people, disabled, the communists and the physically and mentally ill. All of us, Jewish or not Jewish, must keep that historical memory intact and alive, and refuse forms of revisionism and political exploitation of that history. We may not exploit and re-ignite the traumatic dimension of Hitler’s atrocities for the purposes of accusing and silencing those with opposing political viewpoints, including legitimate criticisms of the state of Israel. Such a tactic not only demeans and instrumentalizes the memory of the Nazi genocide, but produces a general cynicism about both accusations of anti-Semitism and predictions of new genocidal possibilities. After all, if those terms are bandied about as so much artillery in a war, then they are used as blunt instruments for the purposes of censorship and self-legitimation, and they no longer name and describe the very hideous political realities to which they belong. The more such accusations and invocations are tactically deployed, the more skeptical and cynical the public becomes about their actual meaning and use. This is a violation of that history, an insult to the surviving generation, and a cynical and excited recirculation of traumatic material—a kind of sadistic spree, to put it bluntly—that seeks to defend and legitimate a very highly militarized and repressive state regime. Of the use of the Holocaust to legitimate Israeli military destructiveness, Primo Levi wrote in 1982, “I deny any validity to [the use of the Holocaust for] this defence.”

We have heard in recent days as well that BDS threatens the attempt to establish a two-state solution. Although many people who support BDS are in favor of a one-state solution, the BDS movement has not taken a stand on this explicitly, and includes signatories who differ from one another on this issue. In fact, the BDS committee, formed in 2005 with the support of over 170 organizations in Palestine, does not take any stand on the one state or two state solution. It describes itself as an “anti-normalization” politics that seeks to force a wide range of political institutions and states to stop compliance with the occupation, unequal treatment and dispossession. For the BDS National Committee, it is not the fundamental structure of the state of Israel that is called into question, but the occupation, its denial of basic human rights, its abrogation of international law (including its failure to honor the rights of refugees), and the brutality of its continuing conditions—harassment, humiliation, destruction and confiscation of property, bombardment, and killing. Indeed, one finds an array of opinions on one-state and two-state, especially now that one-state can turn into Greater Israel with separated Bantustans of Palestinian life. The two-state solution brings its own problems, given that the recent proposals tend to suspend the rights of refugees, accept curtailed borders and fail to show whether the establishment of an independent state will bring to an end the ongoing practices and institutions of occupation, or simply incorporate them into its structure. How can a state be built with so many settlements, all illegal, which are expected to bring the Israeli population in Palestine to nearly one million of its four million inhabitants. Many have argued that it is the rapidly increasing settler population in the West Bank, not BDS, that is forcing the one-state solution.

Some people accept divestment without sanctions, or divestment and sanctions without the boycott. There are an array of views. In my view, the reason to hold together all three terms is simply that it is not possible to restrict the problem of Palestinian subjugation to the occupation alone. It is significant in itself, since four million people are living without rights of mobility, sovereignty, control over their borders, trade and political self-determination, subjected to military raids, indefinite detention, extended imprisonment and harassment. However, if we fail to make the link between occupation, inequality and dispossession, we agree to forget the claims of 1948, bury the right to return. We overlook the structural link between the Israeli demand for demographic advantage and the multivalent forms of dispossession that affect Palestinians who have been forced to become diasporic, those who live with partial rights within the borders, and those who live under occupation in the West Bank or in the open air prison of Gaza (with high unemployment and rationed foods) or other refugee camps in the region.

Some people have said that they value co-existence over boycott, and wish to engage in smaller forms of binational cultural communities in which Israeli Jews and Palestinians live and work together. This is a view that holds to the promise that small organic communities have a way of expanding into ever widening circles of solidarity, modeling the conditions for peaceable co-existence. The only question is whether those small communities continue to accept the oppressive structure of the state, or whether in their small and effective way oppose the various dimensions of continuing subjugation and disenfranchisement. If they do the latter, they become solidarity struggles. So co-existence becomes solidarity when it joins the movement that seeks to undo the structural conditions of inequality, containment and dispossession. So perhaps the conditions of BDS solidarity are precisely what prefigure that form of living and working together that might one day become a just and peaceable form of co-existence.

One could be for the BDS movement as the only credible non-violent mode of resisting the injustices committed by the state of Israel without falling into the football lingo of being “pro” Palestine and “anti” Israel. This language is reductive, if not embarrassing. One might reasonably and passionately be concerned for all the inhabitants of that land, and simply maintain that the future for any peaceful, democratic solution for that region will become thinkable through the dismantling of the occupation, through enacting the equal rights of Palestinian minorities and finding just and plausible ways for the rights of refugees to be honored. If one holds out for these three aims in political life, then one is not simply living within the logic of the “pro” and the “anti”, but trying to fathom the conditions for a “we”, a plural existence grounded in equality. What does one do with one’s words but reach for a place beyond war, ask for a new constellation of political life in which the relations of colonial subjugation are brought to a halt. My wager, my hope, is that everyone’s chance to live with greater freedom from fear and aggression will be increased as those conditions of justice, freedom, and equality are realized. We can or, rather, must start with how we speak, and how we listen, with the right to education, and to dwell critically, fractiously, and freely in political discourse together. Perhaps the word “justice” will assume new meanings as we speak it, such that we can venture that what will be just for the Jews will also be just for the Palestinians, and for all the other people living there, since justice, when just, fails to discriminate, and we savor that failure.

Check out Katha Pollitt’s take on the political firestorm around the BDS panel.

February 7, 2013
Categories: Israel, Palestine | Tags: , , , | Leave a comment

el Khiyyam ex Prison (by Estella Carpi – February 2012)’ex-prigione-di-khyyam-occupazione-umiliazione-annientamento-e-memoria-nel-sud-del-libano

L’ex prigione di Khyyam: occupazione, umiliazione, annientamento e memoria nel sud del Libano

Ignorate le parole del personale amministrativo della caserma di Sidone, in cui dovrete ritirare il permesso giornaliero per poter accedere nei territori del sud, occupati da Israele dal 1978 al 2000. Vi diranno che non vale la pena e che “non c’e’ niente”. Concetto sempre molto relativo che mette in evidenza il divario tra l’approccio turistico-estetico e turistico-etico del visitatore.

testo e foto di Estella Carpi*

La visita all’ex prigione, a mio avviso, si rivela invece estremamente interessante rispetto alla cementificazione idolatrante di reiterate retoriche di vittoria e rivincita della mostra a cielo aperto di Mleeta, eretta nella regione di Iqlim al Tuffah nel 2010.

Mleeta ricorda a molti laici simpatizzanti di Hezbollah come varie legittime argomentazioni del partito siano tuttora inevitabilmente legate a concezioni socio-politiche “confessionalizzanti” degli spazi e dell’esistenza, e spesso incrostate ad una logica militare; nulla togliendo alle sue enormi evoluzioni verso un’ottica nazionalistica gradualmente diversificata dalla matrice iraniana e basata su pilastri localmente vincenti di partecipatività ed inclusione.

I due luoghi di Mleeta e Khyyam paiono ergersi in un’interessante dialettica al cospetto del visitatore non autoctono.

Nel loro comune tentativo di preservare la memoria passata come imperativo morale e rinnovo etico-militare, Khyyam riesce, rispetto a Mleeta, ad offrire la nudità empirica degli spazi della distruzione, oppressione e umiliazione che l’esercito israeliano ha a lungo inflitto in queste zone, e in cui aveva patologicamente costruito il suo stesso senso di sopravvivenza e legittimazione identitarie.

Mleeta sembra un “sigillo” rispetto all’ex prigione di Khyyam, un suo completamento etico, teso allo sforzo positivistico di rielaborare un’etica sociale della vittoria e della compensazione, catalizzatori del senso di riscatto umano che, insieme al processo di ricostruzione postguerra del 2006, ha inondato la quotidianità dei residenti – e non – delle zone devastate dai bombardamenti israeliani.

Poco prima di passare il check-point di Khyyam vi ritroverete a sorpassare il famoso Litani, fiume oggetto di non troppo remote avidità e mire agricolo-economiche israeliane, che lo hanno spesso  reso causa di scontri.

Si ricordi “l’operazione Litani” del marzo del 1978, anno della prima invasione israeliana del Libano meridionale, troppo spesso giustificata in tanti libri di storia come una legittima “risposta” agli atti terroristici dell’OLP a Haifa, nello stesso mese.

La prigione di Khyyam – in arabo letteralmente “tende” – era un’antica caserma istituita nel 1933, quando il Libano era ancora sotto mandato francese, come mi racconta il custode. E’ solo dal 1985 che venne utilizzata da Israele per detenere i prigionieri – uomini, donne e bambini senza distinzione alcuna – delle sue regolari rappresaglie nell’area. Molte storie di torture son raccontate in riferimento a questa prigione, come testimoniano gli oggetti tuttora conservati in uno spazio dell’area dedicato alla sola oggettistica.

Il custode mi mostra anche una sorta di scatola di ferro in cui i prigionieri venivano costretti a sedere fino a 10 giorni consecutivi con le ginocchia ritirate al petto, gli occhi bendati e a testa in giù. I prigionieri venivano portati qui senza aver affrontato alcun processo legale.

Come ha spesso ricordato Robert Fisk, Israele ha sempre negato ogni responsabilità riguardo al trattamento inumano dsei detenuti e al training dei torturatori, accorpati alla sezione militare che allora si occupava di quest’area (South Lebanon Army, SLA).

Fisk racconta come Israele abbia persino impedito per lungo tempo all’organo internazionale della Croce Rossa di visitare la prigione, e come abbia ignorato ripetutamente la condanna da parte di varie organizzazioni per i diritti umani, tra cui Human Rights Watch e Amnesty International.

Il trattamento dei prigionieri, secondo le varie testimonianze, pare fosse ben peggiore di quello attuato nelle stesse carceri israeliane.

Con la fine dell’occupazione israeliana nel sud del Libano del Marzo 2000, torturatori e custodi di Khyyam fuggirono attraverso il confine cercando la protezione del governo israeliano. E’ interessante scoprire come in un futuristico tentativo di paradossale cancellazione della memoria locale che Israele ha pesantemente bombardato anche l’ex prigione durante la guerra inaspettata del 2006, seguita al chiacchierato waad sadeq– la “sincera promessa” – del segretario generale del Partito Hezbollah, Sayyd Hassan Nasrallah, nel suo discorso del 12 luglio 2006, nel quale invocava la liberazione dei prigionieri libanesi nelle carceri israeliane.

A testimoniare i maltrattamenti e i “brain-washing” delle logiche militaristiche israeliane del sovracitato South Lebanon Army, ci sono le parole di Dov Yirmiya, ex luogotenente israeliano, che con la pubblicazione del suo diario sull’invasione del Libano nel 1982 si è procurato il Nobel per la Pace da parte palestinese e l’ostracismo da parte di Israele, come immediata risposta.

Un simile flusso di coscienza in stile sveviano, ma a mio avviso molto più imbevuto di velato auto-giustificazionismo – della stessa stoffa della nota ed anche troppo apprezzata pellicola “Walzer con Bashir” – può essere scorto nelle pur fondamentali parole di Misha Shulman, noto scrittore israeliano, che ricorda le sue percezioni psico-individuali ai tempi del SLA.

“Reducing my entire being to patriotic military jargon seemed ludicrous. Nonetheless, I did my best to assume this fighting spirit as the colonel expected. I immersed myself in early Zionist writings from the times before the ideology and the practice of the doctrine were at odds with each other. The common practice of denial in Marj Ayoun helped to convince both me and my soldiers that our presence in Lebanon was in fact part of a historical struggle for freedom that had been taking place over the past 5,000 years. We were the slaves in Egypt, the Maccabees fighting the Greeks, the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising… We were another chapter in our people’s and our state’s struggle for survival, for peace… I was an occupier in their land, and as such my mind became “occupied” with thoughts that were not my own. My actions contradicted who I am. I will not let it happen again”.

Quello che vedrete a Khyyam è essenzialmente il colore della distruzione e dell’annientamento, ma è in questi “munumenti non intenzionali di guerra” di cui parla Robert Bevan in The Destruction of Memory, Architecture at War che si ritrova il senso di rivincita espresso in un quadro appeso al muro dell’area del carcere oggi dedicata all’oggettistica. Le iniziali in ebraico che distinguevano le sezioni militari israeliane occupanti, estromesse dal Libano nel maggio 2000, son state disegnate utilizzando le scarpe dei combattenti di Hezbollah, eroi della ‘Liberazione’.

L’immagine, mi spiega il custode, vuole suggerire le parole: ha’ak sirmeye, ovvero “vali come un paio di scarpacce”, “non vali nulla” (nella variante dialettale libanese).

Ancora una volta, è in questi monumenti non intenzionali di guerra che si ritrova l’artificiosa essenza di opposizioni identitarie che, in balia di retoriche politiche, difficilmente troveranno un’agnizione finale.

*Estella Carpi è PhD Candidate presso l’Università di Sydney in Australia ed attualmente PhD Fellow presso l’American University of Beirut.

24 febbraio 2012

Categories: Lebanon | Tags: , , | Leave a comment

Hezbollah and the Syrian regime: surviving by sticking to old alliances?

A short interview with a former young militant from Hebzollah about the party’s position on the Syrian uprising. Originally published in The Majalla.

Hezbollah Stubborn on Syria

Former Hezbollah fighter: The party will not change its position on Syria and it will survive after Assad.


An interview with Hussein, a 22 year-old former Hezbollah member and fighter. Originally from Nabatiyeh (Southern Lebanon). Hussein now lives in Beirut. In 2006, during the Israeli aggression on Lebanon, he was only 16 and his responsibilities included delivering Kalashnikov ammunition to the fighters. In 2008, during the clashes between the March 14 coalition and Hezbollah, he was holding his gun in the streets of Beirut.

The Majalla: Do you fear a scenario for Lebanon similar to 2008, which featured confrontations between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian camps? Some media close to the March 14 coalition claim that more weapons are arriving in the Southern suburbs (Al-Dahiyeh Al-Junubiyyeh).

No, listen, Hezbollah knows perfectly that it would lose in the outbreak of a civil war. What happened in 2008 was different: there was no looting and civilians were not harmed, on the contrary, clashes took place between armed factions and Hezbollah was not the only one involved.

Q: Do you think there is any possibility Hezbollah will change its position with regards to the Syrian revolution?

Not after the bombings on the 19th of July [when three leading figures of the Syrian regime, Assef Shawkat, Dawud Rajha and Hassan Turkmani, were killed]. Before these attacks, Nasrullah recognized the necessity of a political change led by the regime, and the mistakes committed by Damascus. However, figures like Hassan Turkmani played a crucial role in supplying weapons to the Resistance [Hezbollah] and I haven’t seen Nasrullah so furious since the murder of Imad Mughniyeh [Hezbollah’s leading military official killed in a car-bombing in Damascus in 2008]. Turkmani and Rajha could have helped launching a political way out, but those chosen to replace them believe exclusively in the military solution.

Q: Do Lebanese Shi’as still believe in the survival of the Syrian regime?

Yes, most of them. The Syrian Government has launched its offensive on Aleppo and maintaining control over the economic capital and Damascus would ensure a good position to resist, even if the countryside is in the hands of the rebels. On the contrary, in case the regime loses Aleppo, we would have another war in the Middle East: Bashar Al-Assad would attack Israel before giving up and I am sure that many Syrians would join us, particularly those who have remained neutral so far.

Q: The Syrian opposition has repeatedly accused Hezbollah of sending special forces to support the Syrian Army, how do you comment on this?

Hezbollah is not in Syria. The party’s special forces wouldn’t be wasted there: they’re the outcome of expensive military training in Iran, aimed at confronting the main enemy, Israel.

Q: Do you fear isolation if the Syrian regime collapses?

I don’t fear isolation, even today Hezbollah keeps on receiving weapons, regardless of what is happening in Syria. Provided that the Muslim Brotherhood seize power in Syria, both Russia and China will keep the channels open between the Resistance [Hezbollah] and Iran. Tehran is still convinced of the survival of Assad, but it will have enough time to pursue an agreement with a hypothetical new Syrian Government led by the Muslim Brotherhood, just like it’s doing in Egypt with [President] Morsi.


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3. Blogging and reporting on five months of revolution from Syria: 5-6 June 2011, Golan to Yarmuk: Palestinians joining the Syrian uprising?

5-6 June 2011, Golan to Yarmuk: Palestinians joining the Syrian uprising?

28 June 2011
yarmouk unrwa bannerWhat really happened between the 5th and the 6th of June among the Palestinians of the refugee camp of Yarmuk in Damascus? Everything started on May 15, the first initiative launched to commemorate the Nakba on May 18, when some Palestinians refugees living in Syria were shot dead by the IDF, while attempting to break in the Israeli borders from the occupied Golan Heights. Even though protests were coordinated by Palestinian activists from Lebanon to Syria to Palestine itself, the Syrian regime promoted the rally with the ultimate aim to deflect attention from the internal uprising. On the 5th of June, the Syrian authorities were even more keen on organizing the Naqsa commemoration along the same lines, transforming the recurrence into another Israeli bloodshed of Palestinians at the border. But this time events developed in an unexpected way for the Syrians.
On June 13, I had the chance to talk with residents of the Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus, particularly with Abu Bassem, actively involved in one of the main youth groups inside the camp. Abu Bassem is currently risking to be incarcerated once again by the security forces, because of the outspoken position he took after the events of June 5.
He recalls perfectly the events occurred the night between the 4th and the 5th, when the PFLP (headed by Taher Maher) stood aside while the PFLP-General Command (Qiyada al-‘Amma), the Syrian watchdog in the Palestinian camps, came to gather participants for the Naqsa initiative, helped by the Syrian security forces. Abu Bassem and his group patrolled the camp all night long to prevent anyone dragging people to die at the border, but it was all in vain, since the two PFLP factions helped the Syrians to find secondary routes to enter the camp.
On Monday (June 6), during the funerals celebrated in Yarmuk for the Palestinians fallen under the Israeli fire the day before, some members of the PFLP-GC came to condole with the families of the martyrs, but they were told to leave the procession immediately, being considered the main culprits for the deaths. The reaction of the PFLP-GC was that some of his militiamen started shooting in the air and chaos erupted in Yarmuk. The office of the PFLP-GC was set on fire and several residents were shot dead during the clashes.
Young Palestinians like Abu Bassem are increasingly taking distances from the Palestinian traditional factions, following a widespread trend in the whole Middle East, where the youth is challenging old political elites. According to the videos published on Electronic Intifada, people in Yarmuk were shouting: “the people want the downfall of the factions” (as-sha’b yuridu isqat al-tafasil), echoing the slogans of the Arab Spring (the people want the downfall of the regime/ as-sha’b yuridu isqat al-nizam). “We know the historical leadership of the PFLP and the current one in Palestine, but we don’t know anything about who are these figures leading the party in Yarmuk,” complains Abu Bassem, “they are only good at appearing on Al-Dunya and As-Suriya [Syrian National TV channels]. For this reason, the group Abu Bassem belongs to, remains independent, which in his words is exactly the feature Palestinian political cadres are scared of. For these reasons, Abu Bassem’s group is planning a Third Intifada against Israel, independent from political parties and religious affiliations: it will be the Intifada of the refugees, based exclusively on the right of return.
Palestinian participation to the Syrian uprising went almost unnoticed so far. In the case of Abu Bassem’s group, and probably of other secular groups, the rejection of any religious affiliation has determined the refusal to join demonstrations at the end of the Friday Prayer. Secondly, even though Abu Bassem’s organization is in touch with the Syrian opposition, they avoided to take sides until now. “In the end, as Palestinians, even if we consider the Syrian ‘resistance discourse’ extremely hypocritical and we are not happy with our status of refugees here,” pointed out Abu Bassem, “that’s all we have and we cannot jeopardize the benefits enjoyed in this hosting country.” Yarmuk is probably the best Palestinian camp in Syria, Abu Bassem is fully aware of this: houses are decent, worth market prices and there is continuous energy. A luxury compared to the Lebanese camps! In general, despite restrictions on land ownership, Palestinians in Syria are fully entitled to government services, education and employment, with good opportunities to find the means to move out of the camps: remarkable concessions, if compared with the state of Palestinians in other Middle Eastern states.
Nonetheless, what happened on June 5, could have shifted the balance in the position of Palestinians towards the regime. “They killed our people, they sell our blood at the border,” says Abu Bassem. This is nothing new to him, as he goes on saying: “the biggest harm to the Palestinian cause remain Arab regimes.” Actually, even if it appears less known to those defending a priori the Syrian anti-Zionist resistance, history is full of episodes when Syrian uncompromising commitment to the Palestinian cause looked contradictory, from the Lebanese Civil War to the almost achieved peace with Israel in 2000. Not without mentioning Rami Makhluf’s recent declarations about the essential contribution of the Ba’th regime to Israeli stability.
What is clear is that Syria cannot afford to lose the Palestinians now, it would be a fatal blow to its propaganda. “They are scared of seeing us taking sides against them and even willing to remove Ahmad Jibril [the leader of the PFLP-GC] from his post, if this can help securing Palestinian support,” this is the streets’ voice in Yarmuk, according to Abu Bassem.

A few days ago, I met again with Abu Bassem. He told me the Syrian mukhabarat are still watching over him, because of his active participation in the camp’s uprising again the PFLP-GC. Once again, Syrian support to Palestinians appears selective and based on national interests, rather than on a ‘just cause’.

Interesting Links:

On the legal status of Palestinians in Syria:

The events of Yarmuk reported by Electronic Intifada:

Appendix on Yarmuk

I felt I should have included this as well, it’s a brief talk I had with another resident of Yarmuk…
After a while we were sitting talking in the restaurant, a veteran of the camp, Ghassan, joined us for a drink. He has a seasoned communist look…large red shirt falling out of some blue jeans, long gray hair tied back and remarkable beard. “Well, nowadays, if they stop me is because they think I am a Salafist ’cause of the beard, but then they realize I have blue jeans and they put me in jail anyway…as a communist!” He goes on poking fun at the rumors spread by the government about supposed armed ‘vandals’ (mukharribin)infiltrated in the camp, pointing out how there are only 35 kalashnikov in Yarmuk (a normal quantity for a Palestinian camp with different factions inside), but the Syrian authorities are fabricating the need of security to legitimize further intervention in the camp. For example, they are suggesting that mukharribin are entering Yarmuk from the neighboring area of Hajar al-Sawda.
With regards to the main political stakeholder in the camp, Hamas, the fact that it did not take a clear position on the unrest has extremely upset Damascus, according to Ghassan, but, at the same time, the Ba’th regime doesn’t seem concerned even about losing bigger allies, as it is evident from the exacerbated relations with Turkey. The unique priority is to gain the upper hand in the repression.

This is also evident by the recent opening to the opposition, embodied in the ‘National Dialogue’ initiative, which has not implied a contemporary end to violent repression

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